Unexpected Albanian summer news (correspondent letter, Morgenbladet)

Albania’s Prime Minister proposes to improve gay rights in the Balkans

While autumn is taking its hold on Norway, summer has far from loosened its grip on Albania. Summers in the formerly closed communist country are typically characterised by dozy stillness, temperatures above 30 degrees, slow ice cream eating, crowded beaches, and dull news.

Albania’s beaches are amongst Europe’s most beautiful, but it is not a purely straightforward undertaking to reach them. The best parts of the Albanian coastline is surrounded by towering mountains, and narrow roads circle around them in patterns which make moving only a few miles ahead take disproportional long – this despite the country’s roads being significantly improved the last few years.

Having in mind the effort it can require getting to Albania’s lovely beaches it is no wonder that the people enjoying them look tired  and relieved.

This summer Albania was stirred out of its hot hibernation by an unexpected initiative from the country’s Prime Minister Sali Berisha: a proposal of a law which would legalise same-sex marriage, allow homosexual couples the same legal rights as heterosexual ones, and prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity.

LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender) rights is one of the saddest parts of the Balkan’s human rights record. The very few openly gay people in the region are regularly victim to discrimination and violence. Serbia’s so far only attempt to arrange a gay pride parade, in 2001, came to a bloody end when a large, armed flock attacked. Police and politicians were passive. The date for this year’s planned parade is kept a secret out of fear of violent mobilisation.

A queer culture festival in Bosnia last autumn was also met with furious, violent opposition. In June this year a masked gang shouting anti-gay slogans attacked a gay literature night in Slovenia – usually not the worst Balkan country on the human rights field. Before the Eurovision final in Serbia last year, ultranationalist groups warned of violent attack should gay people “contaminate” Belgrade with their “evil” disease” during the song contest.

The situation is a bit different, however not much better, in Albania and Kosovo. Although LGBT activists praised Kosovo’s constitution for prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, and gay foreigners usually are accepted, discrimination is widespread in Kosovo as well. In Albania homosexuality was punishable with up to ten years in prison until 1995. An even smaller number of people are openly gay in these two countries than in the rest of the Balkans. LGBT issues are not even talked about. Organisations working for LGBT rights are few and barely visible. Most people simply regard being gay as a disease.

Prime Minister Berisha’s proposal came as something of a surprise. Commentators believe that the law will pass, and if it does, Albania will become the sixth country in Europe, the first Balkan country and the first with a Muslim majority population to allow same-sex couples equal marital rights. During Enver Hoxhas harsh rule over Albania, Berisha served as the medical doctor for some of the country’s communist officials and has since recreated himself as a value conservative market liberal with a taste for populism. The surprise over his announcement did not decrease by the fact that Berisha during the election campaign earlier this year tried to discredit political opponents by calling them “homo”.

Albania’s reaction to the Prime Minister’s proposal was mixed. Many viewed it in the light of Albania’s EU membership application handed in this April and believed it would make the application process easier. One of the country’s few LGBT rights organisations announced that it was proud of the proposal and regarded the issue as a matter of emancipation of Albanian society.

Representatives of Albania’s Muslim and Catholic communities immediately condemned the proposal. A group against gay marriage in Albania was quickly established on Facebook. Media reported that some MPs simply burst into laughter when Berisha presented his proposal.

Albania’s parliament will vote on the proposal in September. Perhaps Albania by then has gotten over its summer doze and realised it is about time to take LGBT rights seriously. No matter how opportunistic the origin of the proposal may have been, it is a step in the right direction: Once one of Europe’s most isolated countries, Albania now has the chance to set the standard within an important human rights field.

Uventet utspill i sommer-Albania (korrespondentbrev, Morgenbladet)

Albanias statsminister med lovforslag som vil forbedre homofiles situasjon på Balkan.

Mens høsten er på full innmarsj i Norge har sommeren på langt nær sluppet taket i Albania. Somre i det tidligere lukkede kommunistlandet er vanligvis preget av døsig stillstand, temperaturer over 30 grader, langsom is-spising, fullpakkete strender og slappe nyheter.

Albania har noen av de vakreste strendene i Europa, men det er ikke helt enkelt å komme seg frem til dem. Kysten er omkranset av ruvende fjell, og smale veier snirkler seg rundt dem på en måte som gjør at det tar uforholdsmessig lang tid å bevege seg kun noen få kilometer i luftlinje. Dette til tross for at landets veinett er blitt kraftig forbedret de siste årene.

Har man i hu den prøvelsen det kan være å komme seg frem til Albanias herlige strender er det ikke rart at menneskene som makelig slanger seg der ser lettede og slitne ut.

Denne sommeren ble Albania røsket opp fra sin dovne, hete dvale av et uventet utspill fra landets nylig gjenvalgte statsminister Sali Berisha: Et forslag om en lov som vil gjøre det lovlig for homofile å gifte seg, juridisk likestille homofile par med heterofile og gjøre det ulovlig å diskriminere folk på bakgrunn av seksuell orientering og kjønnsidentitet.

Homofiles stilling er blant de mest forstemmende delene av Balkans menneskerettighetsrulleblad. Få i regionen er åpent homofile, og de som er det utsettes rutinemessig for diskriminering og vold. Serbias hittil eneste forsøk på å arrangere en homoparade, i 2001, endte i blodsutgytelse da en stor, væpnet flokk angrep. Politi og politikere var passive. Datoen for årets planlagte parade er holdt hemmelig av frykt for voldelig mobilisering.

En ”skeiv kulturfestival” i Bosnia i fjor ble også møtt med rasende, voldelig motstand. I juni i år ble en homolitteraturkveld i Slovenia, vanligvis ikke det verste Balkan-landet på menneskerettighetsfronten, angrepet av en maskert gjeng som ropte anti-homoslagord. Like før Grand Prix-finalen i Serbia i fjor varslet ultranasjonalistiske grupper at homofile ville bli utsatt for vold dersom de ”skitnet til” Beograd med sin ”onde” ”sykdom”.

Situasjonen er litt annerledes, dog ikke mye bedre, i Albania og Kosovo. Selv om Kosovo har en grunnlov priset av homoaktivister for å forby diskriminering på grunn av seksuell legning, og homofile utlendinger stort sett blir akseptert, blir homofile diskriminert i Kosovo også. I Albania var homofili straffbart med opp til 10 års fengsel helt frem til 1995. Svært få homofile i de to landene er åpne om sin legning: Man snakker ikke en gang om homofili der. Organisasjonene som jobber for homorettigheter er få og knapt synlige. Folk flest anser rett og slett homofili som en sykdom.

Statsminister Berishas forslag overrasket mange. Kommentatorer regner med at loven vil bli vedtatt, og Albania blir i så fall det sjette landet i Europa som gir homofile fullverdige ekteskapsrettigheter, det første på Balkan og det første med muslimsk flertall. Under Enver Hoxhas harde styre av Albania var Berisha legen til noen av landets kommunisttopper og har etter kommunismens fall omskapt seg til en verdikonservativ markedsliberaler med sans for det populistiske. Forbløffelsen ble ikke mindre av at Berisha i valgkampen tidligere i år forsøkte å diskreditere politiske motstandere ved å kalle dem ”homo”.

Albanias reaksjon på Berishas utspill var blandet. De fleste så lovforslaget i sammenheng med Albanias søknad om EU-medlemsskap levert i april i år og mange mente det ville gjøre søknadsprosessen lettere. En av landets få homoorganisasjoner uttalte at den var stolt av forslaget og så det som et spørsmål om frigjøring av det albanske samfunn.

Representanter for Albanias islamske og katolske samfunn fordømte lovforslaget umiddelbart. På Facebook ble det raskt opprettet en gruppe mot homofilt ekteskap i Albania. Media rapporterte at enkelte parlamentsmedlemmer simpelthen brøt ut i latter da Berisha la frem sitt lovforslag.

I september skal parlamentet stemme over forslaget. Kanskje har Albania da kommet seg etter sommerdøsen og skjønt at det er på tide å ta homofiles rettigheter på alvor. Samme hvor opportunistisk forslagets opphav kan ha vært, er det et skritt i riktig retning: Etter å ha vært et av Europas mest isolerte land, har Albania nå sjansen til å bli et foregangsland innenfor et viktig menneskerettighetsområde.

The Prizren League Lives (Correspondent letter, Morgenbladet)

The idea of unifying Kosovo and Albania is becoming more current

Last Friday, ten members of Kosovo’s parliament suggested changing the country’s capital. Pristina, today’s capital, is a grey, polluted town with chaotic, worn-out infrastructure and dusty facades. No complete population census has been held in Kosovo since 1981, but Pristina probably has around 300 000 inhabitants.

Prizren has at least 100 000 inhabitants less than Pristina, is fertile and fine-looking with century-old mosques and churches from the middle ages, and even a well-kept Turkish bath from the 16^th century. A monumental castle from the 11^th century is situated in the green hills above Prizren town.

Prizren’s picturesque charm was however not the reason behind the MPs’ capital change initiative. Their statement underlined that Prizren is the spiritual capital of Albanians and a place of historical coexistence between different religions. The proposal was presented the same week as the 131-year anniversary of the League of Prizren, a political organisation the foundation of which marked the Albanian national awakening. The League confirmed Prizren as Albanians’ cultural – and, for a time, political – centre.

For the second consecutive year the League of Prizren anniversary was celebrated with a festival, this year arranged by the Network of Albanian Organisations (RrOSh), with members from across the Balkans. The 131-year anniversary included a cheerful, slightly odd combination of activities: photo exhibitions with Albanian motives, a conference where Albanian intellectuals discussed today’s significance of the League of Prizren, folk dance groups sweeping through Prizren’s brick stone streets, a motorcycle club driving through the town with the Albanian flag and a group of football supporters dressing the Prizren hill in the Albanian colors black and red. The day ended with a street party where a young band invited the audience to dance to old classics.

The possibilities of Kosovo unifying with Albania has so far been a taboo topic amongst Albanian politicians. The international community has defined such unification as a non-issue. Albanians constitute 98% of the population in Albania, around 92% in Kosovo, more than a fourth in Macedonia, and there are significant Albanian minorities in Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece. Unification between Albania and Kosovo has by some internationals been seen as a threat to the stability of these other Balkan-states. Serbia in particular has regarded hints at unification as an aggressive expression of Albanian territorial expansion.

That Albanian unification now is the topic of emerging discussion should be seen in connection with another, highly problematic proposal: partition of Kosovo between an “ethnically clean” Serbian north and Albanian south. A former US Balkan-Ambassador recently suggested such a solution. Both partition and unification were in 2006 defined by the international community as a no-go regarding Kosovo’s status. That the issue of unification is now emerging in parallel with the notion that it suddenly appears to be acceptable to propose ethnic division, is little more than could be expected.

Contrary to the issue of partition, few immediate arguments speak against unification between Kosovo and Albania. Economically and security-wise such a solution could benefit the whole Balkan region. Today’s emerging Albanian unification does not have militant connotations – as at the time of the League of Prizren, the main focus is on common culture, language, arts and on mutual political and economic interests.

So far, the most concrete result of the unification talk is a tunnel which will connect Kosovo with Albania. A few weeks ago the tunnel was opened with much ado by the two countries’ Prime Ministers.
– This represents one of Albanians’ most beautiful dreams come true, stated Albania’s Sali Berisha. – This is the Albanian nation’s tunnel of unity.

Prizrenligaen lever (Korrespondentbrev, Morgenbladet)

Ideen om å slå sammen Kosovo og Albania blir stadig mer aktuell

Fredag forrige uke foreslo ti parlamentsmedlemmer i Kosovo å skifte ut landets hovedstad. Pristina, dagens hovedstad, er en grå og skitten by med kaotisk, sliten infrastruktur og støvete fasader. Det har ikke vært noen fullstendig folketelling i Kosovo siden 1981, men Pristina rommer trolig rundt 300 000 innbyggere.

Prizren har minst 100 000 færre innbyggere enn Pristina, er frodig og billedskjønn med århundregamle moskeer og middelalderkirker, og til og med et velbevart tyrkisk bad fra 1500-tallet. I den grønnkledde åsen over Prizren ligger det en monumental festning fra det ellevte århundret.

Det var neppe Prizrens pittoreske sjarm som lå bak parlamentsmedlemmenes initiativ. Uttalelsen deres understreket at Prizren er albanernes ”åndelige hovedstad” og åsted for historisk sameksistens mellom ulike religioner. Forslaget ble presentert samme uke som 131-års jubileet for Prizrenligaen, en politisk organisasjon hvis stiftelse markerte albanernes nasjonale oppvåkning. Ligaen befestet Prizren som albanernes kulturelle – og, for en tid, politiske – sentrum.

For andre år på rad ble Prizrenliga-jubileet feiret med en festival – i år arrangert av Nettverket av albanske organisasjoner (RrOSh), som har medlemmer over hele Balkan. 131-årsdagen presenterte en snodig, trivelig samling aktiviteter: fotoutstilling med albanske motiver, en konferanse der albanske intellektuelle diskuterte Prizrenligaens betydning i dag, folkedansgrupper svinsende rundt i de brostensbelagte Prizrengatene, en motorsykkelklubb fresende gjennom byen med det albanske flagget og fotballsupportere som kledde Prizrenåsen i de albanske fargene sort og rødt. Dagen ble avsluttet med en gatefest hvor et ungt band bød på dans til albanske svisker.

Mulighetene for at Kosovo vil slå seg sammen med Albania har til nå vært et tabubelagt tema blant albanske politikere. Det internasjonale samfunn har definert forening som en ikke-sak. Albanere utgjør 98% av befolkningen i Albania, omlag 92% i Kosovo, over en fjerdedel av Makedonia, og det finnes betydelige albanske minoriteter i Serbia, Montenegro og Hellas. Sammenslåing mellom Albania og Kosovo har av enkelte internasjonale blitt ansett som en trussel mot stabiliteten i disse Balkan-landene. Spesielt Serbia har tolket antydninger om forening som et aggressivt uttrykk for albansk territoriell ekspansjon.

At albansk samling nå er gjenstand for forsiktig diskusjon bør sees i sammenheng med et annet, høyst problematisk, forslag: å dele Kosovo mellom et ”etnisk rent” serbisk nord og albansk sør. En tidligere amerikansk Balkan-ambassadør gikk nylig ut og støttet en slik løsning. Både deling og sammenslåing ble i 2006 definert av det internasjonale samfunn som en no-go hva angikk Kosovos status. At snakk om sammenslåing kommer parallelt med at det plutselig synes å være stuerent å foreslå etnisk deling, er bare å forvente.

I motsetning til deling av Kosovo er det få umiddelbare argumenter som taler mot forening mellom Kosovo og Albania. Økonomisk og sikkerhetsmessig har en slik løsning potensial til å gagne hele Balkan. Dagens albanske samling har heller ikke militante konnotasjoner. Som på Prizren-ligaens tid er fokuset på felles kultur, kunst og språk, og gjensidige politiske og økonomiske interesser.

Det mest konkrete resultatet av sammenslåingspratet så langt er en tunnel som skal forbinde Kosovo med Albania. For noen uker siden ble tunnelen åpnet med brask og bram av de to landenes statsministere.
- Dette representerer virkeliggjøringen av en av albanernes vakreste drømmer, sa Albanias Sali Berisha. – Dette er den albanske nasjonens foreningstunell.

The Comprehensive UN Sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia – Aims, Impact and Legacy (presentation of my book at NUPI, 16 December 2008)

I will start this presentation with briefly outlining the approach and main conclusions of this book on the comprehensive UN sanctions against the FRY. Then, I will talk a bit about how I think the book could be used to illuminate more contemporary policy issues. After this presentation, I hope you will all have an idea about what went wrong and what we can learn from this case of sanctions. I will talk for around 15 minutes.

Before starting this outline, I need to make clear what area we are talking about here: the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at the time of the UN sanctions 1992-1995 consisted of what is today three separate countries: Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo. This book deals with all of the FRY and not only with Serbia, as most analysis of these sanctions has done so far.

Also relevant to the approach of this book is that it has a political focus. With this, I mean that it reviews the political considerations determining the West’s imposition of sanctions – and the political impact of the sanctions in the target. I am now going to summarise some of my conclusions regarding the effects of the sanctions in the target, before looking at the West’s deliberations determining the imposition of sanctions.

A common critique of sanctions in general, and the sanctions against the FRY in particular, is that they hurt “innocent” people in the target, rather than the “guilty” regime responsible for the policies one wants to change. On the surface, it could seem like this is an accurate summary of the sanctions against the FRY, but a closer look, in my view, reveals that this is not really so.

The true part of this interpretation is that the regime of President Slobodan Milosevic in the short term seemed relatively untouched by the UN sanctions. The leadership might even have managed to benefit from them. In political terms, the sanctions increased people in Serbia and partly also in Montenegro’s scepticism towards the West and may have made some believe that the sanctions and the West – and not the regime – were to blame for all their problems. In economic terms, the sanctions came at a time of economic chaos in the FRY, caused by the wars in Bosnia and Croatia, the economic and political transition from communism, the breakup of Socialist Yugoslavia, and the country’s history of economic mismanagement. The sanctions made this economic chaos worse. The absence of internal/external monitoring and control gave the FRY leadership a chance to strengthen its position in dubious ways, partly through links with businessmen operating in a grey/black zone – some of which remain strong today.

The part of the “innocent suffering”-model that is more debatable is to what extent the “suffering” in the FRY 1992-1995 were due to the sanctions – or perhaps due to the state dissolution, economic and political transition and the costly wars. In the book I argue that the sanctions in themselves did not have serious socioeconomic effects – the situation was rather due to the mixture of the factors just mentioned. It is also important to remember that the socio-economic situation in a country is mainly the responsibility of the leadership of that country. And the FRY elite, to put it mildly, did not seem interested in protecting its citizens from hardship.

Another part of the “innocent suffering” interpretation of these sanctions open to questioning – and a bit more controversial – is to what extent people in the country was “innocent”, or perhaps rather partly responsible for the destructive policies carried out by the Milosevic regime. It is well known that the Belgrade regime was not completely democratic. At the same time, Milosevic was elected into office, several times, and people continued to pay taxes and serve their citizens duties to his regime despite its objectionable policies.

It should be pointed out that this was so for the whole FRY except Kosovo, which at the time was a province of Serbia with a population of around 90% Albanians. After taking away Kosovo’s autonomy in 1989, Milosevic encouraged severe repression of the Albanians there, and as a response, Kosovo’s Albanians were organised in a parallel political and socio-economic system at the time of the sanctions. It is and irony overlooked in previous sanctions analysis that despite being oppressed by the regime targeted by the sanctions, Kosovo was also targeted by them as a part of the FRY – and this made the situation there even worse. Another irony here, is that despite Kosovo suffering from the sanctions, they were interpreted in Kosovo as a sign of political support – because they were directed against the oppressive Milosevic regime.

I will not discuss the long-term effects of the sanctions at length here, but I will mention them in brief: in Serbia, I argue that also in the long term, the sanctions led to an increase in Western-scepticism. In Montenegro I argue that they contributed to a process leading to the independence of the country, because they showed the Montenegrin leadership that association with Milosevic was costly. In Kosovo, I argue that the sanctions have contributed to the country’s unconditional pro-Western attitude. In the whole region, the sanctions probably contributed to undermine people’s faith in the rule of law. These long-term effects I hope will be discussed further by the panels here.

This is what I would like to say here about the impact of the UN sanctions on the civilian population in the FRY.

It does however seem that the sanctions were also targeted directly against the leader of the country, Milosevic, to make him compromise over the Bosnian War, and end it. Sadly, the West did not convince Milosevic that the sanctions were part of a process where harder measures would be imposed if he continued the Bosnian War, that he would have more and more to fear from the West, and more and more to lose, if he did not stop it. It was too obvious at the time – and even more obvious today – that the sanctions were a product of Western disunity. Milosevic must have been assured that the sanctions were the ultimate measure of what the West could come up with against him. At the same time, they did not threaten his power in the short term – nor did they sufficiently limit his country’s material ability to wage war. It is possible, though, that at the end of the war, after three and a half years of sanctions, after military force had been used against the Serbs, and when the situation on the ground was starting to turn against them, that getting the sanctions lifted worked as a face-saver for Milosevic, making it easier for him to conclude the war and similarly appear victorious.

I will now go back to the imposition of sanctions, and look at the Western considerations determining that choice. Seen in relation to the effects just described, this is where I think most lessons can be learned from this case

In the book, I show that although the sanctions were formally imposed to stop the Bosnian war, they were clearly not intended to solve the Yugoslav conflict. The sanctions should be seen partly as a symbolic act meant to tell the world and Western public opinion that action had been taken over the war, that the West was able to do “something”, united, and that military force would not be necessary.

Promoters of sanctions sometimes stress that, in addition to the legal issues involved, sanctions are better than military force because they don’t kill people. On the other hand, the generally accepted ‘lesson’ from the Bosnian War is today that the world did too little, too late, and that armed force should be used much sooner. This is important to note when discussing sanctions. Because what this shows is that, if you choose “softer” measures, such as sanctions, instead of “harder” measures, such as military force, and you fail because your choice was too soft, the “soft policy” would not have saved lives at all: it might instead have prolonged warfare and caused killings that could have been avoided with more forceful and determined action.

But to acknowledge this, a broad, and long-term perspective on conflict and troubled areas is needed. And this is where I think the most actual and relevant lesson from this case of sanctions can be found. I have been based in Kosovo for the last two years now, as a researcher and political analyst, and I see some parallels to the Western imposition of the sanctions against the FRY and the Western policies in Kosovo today. As we all know, Kosovo has been run by a UN mission for more than nine years now, and a EU mission is supposed to take over. As I see it, like at the time of the imposition of sanctions, the aim of the West in Kosovo or the Balkans is not to solve problems. The West’s involvement in Kosovo is instead driven by short term-concerns: above all to avoid inconvenience expressed as immediate regional security threats and political embarrassment for the West itself. The path of least resistance is usually chosen before what may be costlier in the short term, but could be really effective in the longer term, and would ensure development and sustainable peace for Kosovo and for the Balkans.

The result of this short-term Western approach is that Kosovo today is a place of vast social problems, increasing, and internationally supported, ethnic partition, a place where – contrary to any basic definition of democracy – there is no separation of powers and the international leadership is completely unaccountable to the population – something which nurtures an unhealthy political culture and creates widespread apathy and frustration. In creating such a place, the West must have believed it could avoid inconvenience. But I think that is an ill-informed assumption, at best. The strategy of the West in the Balkans – today as at the time of the UN sanctions – is instead laying the ground for continuous problems, possibly also renewed conflict.

In the end, I would like to stress that the troublesome results of the comprehensive UN sanctions against the FRY should not be taken to conclude that sanctions could never work. It is even possible that sanctions could have worked in this specific case – if they had been part of a more comprehensive and longer-term strategy, where the target was convinced that the costs of not doing as the sanctioners wanted would be high – increasingly high – a strategy possibly involving the use of force – but more importantly, a strategy based on proper knowledge and analysis of the political and economic dynamics of the target, a strategy including forceful sanctions implementation by united actors clear on the reasons for and purpose of their action. These elements are probably necessary for any case of using sanctions. And a similar determination, and long-term approach, should also be shaping the Western policies towards the Balkans today

Costs and Benefits (10 November 2008)

The rejection of Ban Ki Moon’s six-point plan by Prime Minister Thaci and President Sejdiu does not change the ominous future prospects for Kosovo created by the deal struck between Serbia and the EU last week. The deal determines that EULEX shall be “neutral” to Kosovo’s “status” and act within Resolution 1244 – which put together means that EULEX considers Kosovo as a part of Serbia, and not as independent. So much for “neutrality”. The ongoing EU-Belgrade and UNMIK-Belgrade negotiations are negotiations on the power over Kosovo’s territory, which means nothing less than new status negotiations. Thaci and Sejdiu’s rejection of the six points is little more than a call to be included in these new status negotiations.

 

These developments should be seen as the predictable result of cost-benefit calculations on all sides – including on the part of Kosovo’s political leadership. A simple summary of the calculations involved would look as follows:

 

Firstly, the EU: The EU apparently believes that, since Kosovo has accepted so much so far – the Ahtisaari Plan, delaying the declaration of independence, and so on – it can be pushed to accept even more without inconveniencing the EU with protests and defiance. Serbia, on the other hand, has accepted very little, and protested loudly, sometimes also violently, at any hint of it making a concession on Kosovo. These Serbian protests is seen by the EU as a great – and, oddly, as an unexpected – inconvenience, indeed, as an embarrassment.

 

The EU seems to want Serbia as the key strategic ally in the Western Balkans and to keep Serbia’s EU perspective alive. The EU certainly wants to avoid a hostile Serbia at almost any cost. At the same time, the EU wants its Kosovo mission, its greatest foreign policy project, ever, to be a success. Threats to regional stability – in the form of political defiance or straight-out violence – endangers the short-term success of this project. Consequently, the EU sees the short-term cost of yielding to Serbia’s demands as much lower than pressuring Serbia. It is easier to give in to Serbia, than to show teeth. On the other hand, measured by the reactions of the government and the President to the EULEX-Serbia deal, the EU has so far been right in that pressuring Kosovo, on the other hand, is completely cost-free.

 

Secondly, Serbia: Given the EU’s priorities and considerations, Serbia has little, if anything at all, to lose by continuing its defiant political positioning. Absurdly, it seems like Serbia wants the EU less than the EU wants Serbia. The country has nothing to gain from letting go of any of its demands on Kosovo – it gains from not giving them up. The latest result is that with the EU-Serbian deal, Serbia has managed to make the EU in Kosovo no more than another UNMIK.

 

Thirdly: It is notable that not even Kosovo’s political leadership seems to feel it has anything to lose by being complicit in the return to negotiations on Kosovo’s status and acceding to Europe’s retreat from supporting independence. The feeble reaction from Kosovo’s political leadership to the EULEX-Serbia deal shows once again how far away this leadership is from serving the people and working to realise the interests of the people. The leadership seems to consider that it has really nothing to lose (personally) on making new concessions on status, and regards its position safe – the opposition small and disunited, elections a year or more into the future, and there is no real public objections. The increasing number of critical newspaper articles and civil society statements does not change any of the calculations above, because they are still few in numbers, too frail, and, in the end, not sufficiently embarrassing for the government or the EU to make any difference.

 

The story of Ali Kadriu and his house in Suhadoll tells us something about the issue of costs and benefits in today’s Kosovo. Initially UNMIK apparently thought it could get away with blocking Kadriu from renovating his house, keeping him in detention for hours and demanding that he gets permission from his Serb neighbours before starting to work on his own property. Blocking Kadriu did not seem to cost UNMIK anything. However, the determined insistence of Kadriu and the people supporting him, embarrassed and discredited UNMIK, in public, and left it too costly and inconvenient to keep on denying Kadriu the right to determine the future of his own property. So he won, at least for now. To reverse today’s worrying developments; Kosovo needs more of this determined insistence.

The ICJ – Two challenges and one non-challenge (Koha Ditore 13 October)

On Wednesday, the UN General Assembly approved Serbia’s request to the International Court of Justice seeking its advisory opinion on the legality of Kosovo’s declaration of independence. This poses two challenges to Kosovo – one obvious and one not so obvious.

The first, obvious, challenge has to do with the discussion before this vote. In the run-up to the vote, Serbia managed portrayed approval by the General Assembly as a victory in itself, while the request was always going to be approved. To deny the court to issue an opinion on this would just be absurd – the only argument for voting against would be that the process would take time, which is not really an argument. The ones that have been trying to argue against approval have just created the impression that they are afraid of the outcome of the ICJs opinion. They shouldn’t be. Kosovo’s independence has legal basis in international law. Rather than arguing against the vote and the process, that is what the argument should be about.

There are two simple ways to present the case for Kosovo’s independence fitting into the framework of existing international law. The first is to regard it as a part of the dissolution of Socialist Yugoslavia, the second is as a matter of self-determination. Both lines of argument, or even a combination of the two, are placed on solid legal foundations, which there is no space to outline here. In the context of the ICJ’s review of Kosovo’s independence the first legal knot for Kosovo’s government and international actors like the USA and the UK is that Kosovo has been presented from a start as a special case. The second problem is the insistence to frame Kosovo’s independence within UN Security Council Resolution 1244. This was a stupid idea from the beginning, now more than ever. By chosing a 1244/sui generis justification for Kosovo’s independence the UK and USA and others have locked themselves in a legal corner. But this does not mean it is too late to get out.

The second, much greater and much more important challenge the ICJ vote poses, is to make sure that Serbia does not manage to partition Kosovo during the 2-3 years the court is working. The year’s catch-phrase among international officials dealing with Kosovo here provides reasons for concern: “the situation on the ground”. While the “situation on the ground” in Kosovo was not really much of an issue for the international community during the 1990s, or even after 1999 for that matter – when taking this situation into account would have benefited around 94% of Kosovo’s population – now this term is used to the detriment of the vast majority, in order to justify a gradually harder partition of Kosovo, very possibly with gradually greater benefits for the Serb side.

There are two ways this challenge could be dealt with. One is to insist on the unity of Kosovo and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country. But Kosovo presently has no way to guarantee its own territorial integrity without the international community’s political will. Despite the vast international presence here and despite the recognitions of Kosovo’s independence of many powerful countries, no political will seems to exist to guarantee this independence, or the borders of the recognise country. The second way, which will probably turn out to be smarter in the short term and more viable in the long term, is to start to talk about what partition would mean with regards to Preseva and the prospects of unifying with Albania. If the Serbs in the north should be allowed more formalised separation from Pristina, there is no reason why the Albanians in Preseva should not get the chance to break relations with Belgrade. As for unification with Albania, this should not be more of a taboo than partition – in the process of defining Kosovo’s status the two issues had the same level of importance, each as one of the Contact Group’s “three NOs”. Closer formal ties with Albania will arguably be necessary even if partition should be avoided.

In the end, about a challenge the ICJ vote does not pose. It has been claimed that countries that so far have not recognised Kosovo will use the ICJ process as an excuse not to recognise Kosovo until the Court’s opinion is issued. But why would they ever need an excuse not to recognise Kosovo? The vote is not proof that Kosovo needs to focus all its efforts into getting more countries to recognise its independence. This whole line of thinking represents a huge distraction from Kosovo’s real problems: economic underdevelopment and social and political disempowerment. Recognitions are not the way to solve these problems. Kosovo’s government has no excuses anymore: it now needs to, first, demand that the increasingly pathetic international UNMIK/EU chaos conglomerate let go of their total powers, and then, to work to show the world, but most of all the citizens of this country, what this independence is really worth.

Autumn in Kosovo (Correspondant letter, Morgenbladet 3 October)

It is autumn in Kosovo, and Ramadan has just come to an end. Kosovo is a secular country, where most people seem to be as little preoccupied with religion as most people in Norway. Only a few here follow Ramadan by not eating or drinking during the day, and a small number of restaurants in the capital Pristina was closed. My daily encounter with Ramadan happened at the bakery where I live, which only had fresh bread at Iftar, at sunset, and not during the rest of the day, and baked a certain kind of pita bread they do not have during the rest of the year.

 

Kosovo seems to have entered a state of political lethargy. Recognitions of the young country’s independence still get attention in the local media, but the whole process has slowed down. It is more than two weeks since Samoa was added to the list of recognising countries, as number 47. Serbia’s initiative directed towards getting the Internationa Court of Justice (ICJ) to issue an opinion on the legality of Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence has marely led to some awkward mumbling on the part of Kosovo’s political leadership, while the strongest statements on the issue have come from Britain and the USA. Surprisingly few have gone for the obvious strategy: stated that Kosovo’s independence does indeed have a basis in international law, and pointed out that the ICJ will spend at least 2-3 years on the case before issuing its “advisory” opinion, by which time the topic will be much less relevant than today.

 

Confusion regarding who is holding what sort of authority over which areas in Kosovo continues to reach unprecedented heights. The UN mission UNMIK was supposed to be long gone from Kosovo by now, leaving its power to a EU-led mission, but UNMIK is showing no signs of a dignified departure: while suggesting new, strongly unpopular new negotiations with Serbia, UNMIK is also renewing contracts for some international staff with a whole year, and firing most of its local employees. The only thing UNMIK and the EU seem to have agreed on is a “technical agreement”, which makes it “clear” that the EU can take over some of UNMIK’s equipment, but that UNMIK can demand it back at any time. The respected think tank International Crisis Group stated last week that “no single real authority exists today in Kosovo”. This is only half true. The Serbian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights recently showed that in the Serb-populated areas of the country, especially in the north, Serbia is in charge. According to the Committee Serbia is working actively to prevent integration between Kosovo’s 90% Albanians and 6% Serbs.

 

One positive development is that the power cuts in the city are rarer these days, and happen mostly at night. The temperature has sunk around 20 degrees the last weeks, but the central heating has yet to be turned on, although the bill was due over a month ago. “Too few people in the building paid”, my landlord explained when I bumped into him in the stairs a while ago.

 

The yearly Apple Day was just celebratied in Kovragi in Istog, known for growing the country’s best apples. People travelled there to look at the ripe apples and to get a taste of Kovragi’s apple brandy. RTK, the public TV channel later broadcasted a programme about the day, where analysts, apple farmers and international support organisations were interviewed in front of an apple tree. While the interviewees talked about the importance of local agricultural production, the camera dwelled patiently with the red apples, wet from the autumn rain.

Høst i Kosovo (Korrespondentbrev, Morgenbladet, 3.oktober)

Det er høst i Pristina nå, og Ramadan er nettopp avsluttet. Kosovo er et utpreget sekulært land, hvor de fleste synes å være like lite religiøsto pptatt som de fleste i Norge. Kun noen få her fulgte Ramadan-måneden ved at de ikke spiste eller drakk i løpet av dagen – og et knippe restauranter i hovedstaden var stengt. Selv merket jeg Ramadan best på at bakeriet der jeg bor bare hadde ferskt brød til Iftar, ved solnedgang, og ikke i løpet av dagen, og at de hadde et spesielt type pitabrød de ikke lager resten av året.

Kosovo synes å ha gått i politisk dvale. Anerkjennelsene av det unge landets uavhengighet får fortsatt mye oppmerksomhet i media, men hele prosessen har saknet fart. Det er over to uker siden Samoa, det 47. landet i rekken, anerkjente Kosovo. Serbias initiativ rettet mot å få the International Court of Justice (ICJ) til å uttale seg om legaliteten av Kosovos selvstendighet har bare fått politikerne her til å vri ubekvemt på seg og mumle litt, mens de sterkeste uttalelsene mot tiltaket har kommet fra USA og Storbritannia. Få har tatt den åpenbare linjen: presentert argumenter for at Kosovos uavhengighet har et legalt grunnlag innen internasjonal rett, og påpekt at ICJ-prosessen uansett vil ta minst 2-3 år, og når den omsider kommer med sin ”rådgivende uttalelse” vil hele tematikken være langt mindre viktig enn i dag.

Forvirringen over hvem som egentlig bestemmer over hva i Kosovo når stadig uante høyder. FN-kontigenten UNMIK skulle vært ute av landet for lenge siden, og overlatt makten til EU, men UNMIK gir ingen tegn til å gå for en verdig adferd: samtidig som UNMIK foreslår nye, høyst upopulære forhandlinger mellom Serbia og Kosovo, fornyet kontingenten visse internasjonale kontrakter i ett helt år mens de fleste lokale UNMIK-ansatte vil bli sagt opp. Det eneste UNMIK og EU synes å ha blitt enige om angaaende maktoverføringen, er en “teknisk avtale”, som for noen uker siden gjorde det ”klart” at EU kunne overta noe av UNMIKs utstyr, men at UNMIK kunne kreve det tilbake når som helst. Den respekterte tenketanken Internasjonal Crisis Group uttalte forrige uke at ”no single real authority exists today in Kosovo”. Dette er bare en halvveis sannhet: Serbias Helsingforskomité viste nylig at i de serbiske områdene i landet, spesielt i nord, har Serbia full kontroll. I følge Komiteen jobber Serbia aktivt for å ødelegge alle muligheter for integrering mellom Kosovos 90% albanere og 6% serbere.

En positiv utvikling er imidlertid at strømkuttene i byen er blitt sjeldnere, og foregår mest om natten. Temperaturen har sunket rundt tyve grader de siste ukene, men sentralfyringen er ikke skrudd på enda, selv om regningen ble betalt for over en måned siden. ”Det var for få i blokka som betalte”, forklarte leilighetseieren da jeg traff han i trappeoppgangen for en stund siden.

Årets store Epledag ble nettopp feiret i landsbyen Kovragi i Istog, som er kjent for å ha de beste eplene i landet. Folk strømmet til langveis fra for å se på de modne eplene og smake på Kovragis eplebrennevin. Statskanalen RTK sendte i etterkant et timelangt TV-program, der en rekke analytikere der en rekke analytikere, epledyrkere og internasjonale stoetteorganisasjoner ble intervjuet foran et epletre. Kameraet dvelte lenge ved bilder av de røde, regnvåte eplene mens intervjuobjektene snakket om viktigheten av lokal jordbruksproduksjon.

Kosovo Without Coordinates (Morgenbladet, 1 August, 2008)

Almost six months after Kosovo’s declaration of independence the extraordinary has become the norm.

Last Friday, Head of the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), Lamberto Zannier, in the UN Security Council declared himself incapable of exerting his powers. On paper, Zannier personifies the country’s executive, judiciary and legislative powers – that is, on one set of papers. Now the problem is to clarify exactly which papers should decide on issues of power in Kosovo: UN Resolution 1244, awarding UNMIK near absolute authority? Kosovo’s unique constitution, which declares Kosovo an independent and sovereign state while at the same time, gives up this sovereignty to an EU-led contingent? The recommendation from the UN Secretary-General saying that Kosovo shall be independent, though temporarily supervised by an international mission? Or the statement from the same Secretary-General expressing that Kosovo is not independent, but should be shared between Serbia and an international governing body?

People in Kosovo have long wanted UNMIK gone in order to run themselves. Also UNMIK’s employees are generally eager to get away from a place they usually dislike, and to leave their responsibilities to the EU. It is however questionable whether the UN Security Council will let go of UNMIK that easily. Serbia and Russia continue to object to a downphasing or “reconfiguration” of UNMIK and apparently want more in return for limiting their intransigence than what they have been offered so far.

Meanwhile, people here are occupied with more prosaic issues like high unemployment and frequent power cuts. Polls show that Kosovo’s energy provider KEK is the country’s least popular institution. KEK’s explanation of the summer’s restrictions is “increased consumption”, making people wonder whether the situation is really caused by maladministration or perhaps sale of energy that should have been delivered to people here.

Kosovo’s water services situation is not straightforward either. All over the country, water is being held back throughout the night, sometimes also during the day. In the North of Kosovo – where most of the population is Serb – an Albanian village has encountered more serious water problems. After nine attempts to build a 700 meter long water pipe to the village, the construction was stopped by Serbs throwing stones and chasing off police and KFOR soldiers trying to monitor the construction. It seems likely that the water pipe now will become several times longer – and built under the river Ibar, through an Albanian-populated area in order to avoid renewed violence from Serbs.

On the Albanian side of the divided city Mitrovica, three mysterious trucks full of heavy poison are to be found. Apparently the poison trucks have arrived in Kosovo, via Macedonia from Iran without any further plan. People in Mitrovica are reporting breathing trouble, skin problems and vomiting they believe to be caused by the poison. Last week, demonstrations for removing the poison trucks were harshly stopped by the police. Attempts to send the trucks back out of the country have been rejected because the poison is said to be too dangerous.

Serbia’s arrest of war crimes accused Radovan Karadzic has been received positively also in Kosovo, though at the same time it is pointed out that Serbia also kept him in hiding all these years, and that Ratko Mladic is the one who really should be arrested. Others consider the arrest as part of a political game where Serbia will gain at Kosovo’s cost, and suspect the arrest for being timed to overshadow the meeting between US President George W. Bush and Kosovo’s President and Prime Minister.

Otherwise, media report that foreigners do not need visa to work and live in Kosovo and that the number of Chinese immigrants increased last year. One part of the capital Pristina with many Chinese-owned shops is already being called Chinatown.

In this extraordinary, “global” Kosovo, people are spectators while the country’s coordinates remain in the making.